Business Times - 08 Nov 2006
Value of top 15 S'pore brands hits record $12b
SingTel tops for fifth year running, at $2.67b
By JEAN CHUA
(SINGAPORE) Singapore's top names are now worth more than ever - a total of $12 billion, says brand consultant Interbrand. The figure is 26 per cent higher than last year, when the top 15 local brands were valued at $9.5 billion.
At the Singapore Brand Award presentation ceremony yesterday, International Enterprise (IE) Singapore deputy CEO Ted Tan said: 'We are glad to see Singapore companies paying close attention to their brands. By doing so, they can achieve more extensive market penetration and maximise their brand visibility both in local and international markets.'
The Singapore Brand Award, now in its fifth year, is IE Singapore's initiative to help Singapore companies develop their brands. Interbrand is its partner.
Rankings are based on the value of a company's brands as assessed by Interbrand, which performs similar valuations for about 3,500 brands worldwide.
Only profitable, public-listed companies are short-listed for the awards, and they must be home-grown or headquartered in Singapore for at least 10 years.
This year, Singapore Telecom topped the list for the fifth year running. Its brand value rose 8 per cent to $2.67 billion, which includes the value of its Australian unit Optus in Interbrand's calculations.
Financial institutions did well, with UOB, DBS and OCBC taking second, third and six spots. Their total brand value rose 19.1 per cent to $4.76 billion.
Coming in fourth was Asia Pacific Breweries, whose brand value went up 11 per cent to $1.36 billion.
No 5 was new entrant Shangri-La, whose brand is worth $1.22 billion.
When a company owns more than one brand name, a portfolio of its flagship brands is considered instead. This is typically the case for F&B manufacturers such as F&N, Petra Foods and Food Empire.
The other top brands this year are Tiger Balm, Creative Technology, OSIM, Brands, Singapore Airlines and Great Eastern Life.
In particular, Interbrand said wellness products such as Brands, OSIM and Eu Yan Sang are making serious headway establishing themselves in the region.
Interbrand's managing director and director of Asia-Pacific, Stuart Green, said: 'Leading Singapore companies continue to realise the rewards of moving up the value chain; the need to own the consumer relationship and benefit from the premium and loyalty this confers.'
New this year was a 'Top Five Fastest Growing Brands' category, which named Eu Yan Sang, OSIM, UOB, Super Coffeemix and Popular.
Copyright © 2005 Singapore Press Holdings Ltd. All rights reserved.
Wednesday, November 08, 2006
Friday, October 20, 2006
BT: 19 S'pore firms on Forbes Asia SME list (20 Oct 2006)
19 S'pore firms on Forbes Asia SME list
List ranks Asia Pacific's top 200 listed companies with sales of less than US$1b
By LAUREL TEO
SINGAPORE is punching above its weight when it comes to churning out the region's top small and medium enterprises, according to the latest Forbes Asia listing.
Nineteen names from Singapore have made the list of Asia-Pacific's top 200 listed companies with sales below US$1 billion. In comparison, Malaysia contributed eight, Hong Kong 12, and South Korea 11.
Japan, with a population of more than 125 million, equalled Singapore's record in this year's rankings. But the runaway champion is Taiwan, which produced 31 winners, mostly from the electronics and technology sector.
Forbes Asia editor Tim Ferguson said: 'Taiwan's impressive showing underscores both the entrepreneurial nature of the Taiwanese economy and its under-appreciated role as a hub for technology hardware.'
The secret of Taiwan's success is to pick battles well. According to Jack Huang, who runs a law practice in Taiwan and has worked with successful entrepreneurs there, this means targeting niche markets so small and insignificant that bigger companies would not bother with them.
In the latest Forbes list, Singapore improved on its 2005 score of 11 winners. But only two from last year's list - water specialist Hyflux and marine group Jaya Holdings - made this year's honour roll.
The other Singapore representatives this year include stock market darlings such as rig and ship-builder Labroy Marine, oil and gas equipment supplier KS Energy Services, and crane operator Tat Hong.
This year's overall list for the region saw a high turnover rate, with eight in 10 companies new entrants. Forbes Asia's Mr Ferguson said: 'The Asian Pacific economy is fluid and this is best seen at the small and medium-sized enterprise level.'
Other countries on the list include China with 29 entrants, Australia (27), India (23), Thailand (11), and Indonesia (5). New Zealand, Pakistan and Sri Lanka each had fewer than five entrants.
According to Forbes Asia, most of the mainland Chinese companies, as well as many Japanese and Indian firms, focus largely on their domestic markets.
Copyright © 2005 Singapore Press Holdings Ltd. All rights reserved.
Thursday, May 12, 2005
Westcomb
d.o.g.
Junior Member
Posts: 78 Registered: 3-1-2005 Member Is Offline
posted on 10-5-2005 at 07:16 PM
Quote:
How do they earn money from underwriting IPO?
There are 2 components in the fund-raising portion of an IPO. The first part is the "roadshow" - the promoter goes out canvassing for investors to buy up the placement shares. It earns a fee for this marketing effort. The second part is the underwriting. The promoter may or may not choose to underwrite the issue. If it does underwrite the issue, it earns a separate commission, usually a percentage of the money raised by the company. There's usually a fixed minimum for the fee charged, which is why some small companies end up paying a large percentage of the funds raised to the underwriter.
Quote:
My rudimentary understanding from the term "underwriting" is to bear the undesirable consequence on behalf of the insured for a fee.What does it mean in the case of underwriting for IPO?
An underwriter for an IPO guarantees the company (the insured) against a failure of the IPO (undersubscription for the shares being offered). If the underwriter cannot find enough buyers for all available shares, it has to buy any excess shares itself. Thus the company itself is protected against the possibility of a failed IPO. This risk has been transferred to the underwriter.
A good example of the underwriter being called upon would be Chartered Semiconductor's failed rights issue a couple of years back. Merrill Lynch chose to underwrite the issue, and when the rights issue failed, Merrill Lynch had to buy up all the unsubscribed rights and exercise them, becoming a shareholder of Chartered. Ultimately the share price of Chartered rose enough that Merrill Lynch managed to dispose of the shares and come out ahead, but it illustrates the risks involved with being too hungry for business.
Normally the promoter will underwrite an IPO only if it's confident it can sell all the shares, or if it's desperate for business. Naturally, an underwritten IPO commands higher fees than a non-underwritten one, otherwise nobody would take on the additional risk. If the issue is large, there may be more than one underwriter, and the risks and fees are shared accordingly.
-------------------------------------------
d.o.g.
Junior Member
Posts: 78 Registered: 3-1-2005 Member Is Offline
posted on 10-5-2005 at 08:58 PM
Quote:
The marketing of the issue is being carry out together by a public relation company and a investment/capital company. In westcomb case is actually taken by "Westcomb Capital" and "Quattro Media". Where both earn commission base on a pre agreement amount. It is so?
I was writing in general terms and was not referring specifically to Westcomb. However it would not be surprising that the marketing is being done by 2 separate companies under a common owner. This allows the IR/PR and promoting/underwriting companies to operate independently of each other and potentially capture additional business on their own.
Quote:
So most of revenues earn from IPO by "Westcomb Capital " actually come from:Pre- IPO --- Teaching and leading a company to become a listed company.Post - IPO --- What kind of services is needed here???
For the IR/PR company:
Pre-IPO Services:
1. marketing via roadshows, TV/press coverage
2. development of corporate IR website
Post-IPO services:
1. press releases
2. answering simple questions from the public
3. maintenance of corporate IR website
For the promoting/underwriting company:Pre-IPO services:
1. assistance with share registration
2. restructuring of shareholdings
3. creation of nominee accounts
4. ensure compliance with listing rules
5. marketing via roadshows, TV/press coverage
Post-IPO services:nil
================
That's more or less it, in a nutshell. It should be clear that the investment banking arm generates the bulk of the revenue, but it's all one-off. Only the IR/PR business has consistent revenue, but it's peanuts. That's why Westcomb has a capital markets licence - so that it can operate its own pre-IPO fund to generate additional profits, or so it hopes.
Westcomb also has a stockbroking licence, to provide additional share-related services like nominee services, (maybe) margin lending etc. This will allow it to squeeze a few more dollars from its existing clients. It's always cheaper to extract more cash from your current clients then to acquire a new client. Westcomb's growing array of services is probably following this line of thought.
It's true that IPOs (which are one-off in nature) apparently constitute only 1/3 of revenue, but keep in mind that the so-called ECM and stockbroking activity that makes up half of revenue is also one-off. How many times can any one company raise debt or sell equity? How much can you earn on stockbroking fees when you don't cater to the mass market or private banking clients? Think about it. This company's true recurring revenue is only the PR and fund management activity - just 7% of revenue.As usual, the standard disclaimers apply.
-----
d.o.g.
Junior Member
Posts: 78 Registered: 3-1-2005 Member Is Offline
posted on 11-5-2005 at 10:44 AM
Quote:
The main question is as to whether the 12.3M revenue from"Securities trading and ECM syndication" is composed mainly of IPO related activity.Sage and d.o.g do not seem to think so.
To be more accurate, I'm not really concerned as to whether securities trading and ECM syndication consists mostly of IPO-related activity. What I am concerned about is that whether IPO, listed company or private equity, ALL investment banking activities are non-recurrent in nature. In other words, Westcomb's business is highly volatile. There is no such thing as a regular customer - every customer is new.
Quote:
this company HAS consistently increased revenue and profits over the past four years by generating new clients not from increasing recurrent income - so maybe they are good at it?
They may have been good the past 4 years, but unfortunately the past is no guide to the future. The recent past is a reasonable glimpse of the future only when business conditions are assumed to be stable. But without regular customers and most of its business from China (hardly a stable environment), is there any predictability?
The second weakness of Westcomb is poor scalability. There is a human limit to the number of deals each team can do. Beyond that you just need more bodies.
And Westcomb can't go for bigger deals per team - Choo Chee Kong himself admitted that they are limited to deals of a certain size (either $30m or $100m IIRC). Beyond this the companies will go straight to the big boys.So while the numbers look good (as with almost all professional services companies) Westcomb is held back by 2 fundamental weaknesses in its core investment banking business:
1. Revenue is one-off in nature; and
2. Poor scalability.
And of course to top it off China's new SAFE-related regulations have dammed the flow of deals, so the future is murky to say the least.
There's a good reason why most investment banks also house proprietary trading desks or live under the wing of a commercial bank - investment banking earnings are just too volatile for the business to survive independently.
----------------------
d.o.g.
Junior Member
Posts: 78 Registered: 3-1-2005 Member Is Offline
posted on 12-5-2005 at 11:23 AM
Quote:
unlock
westcomb become something like Morgan stanley or Price Water house Coopers
g18
It takes a very long time to build up a franchise and brand name like Morgan Stanley.
Morgan Stanley's current troubles also illustrate that:
1. Reputation is THE key asset, but it can be destroyed easily by a few bad moves; and
2. I-banking is tremendously dependent on key staff (rainmakers). If they leave, the business follows them.
Westcomb is similarly dependent on its team leaders and Choo Chee Kong's reputation and contacts from his time at DBS. If any staff conflicts arise, the teams will be weakened and clients will be scared off. There are many small i-banks even in Singapore - just look at who's been bringing IPOs to market lately.
And apart from the boutique i-banks you still have the larger full service i-banks backed by banks and financial institutions. So IMHO Westcomb is walking a tightrope. So far, so good - but it's always going to be a tightrope - with no safety net below.
Junior Member
Posts: 78 Registered: 3-1-2005 Member Is Offline
posted on 10-5-2005 at 07:16 PM
Quote:
How do they earn money from underwriting IPO?
There are 2 components in the fund-raising portion of an IPO. The first part is the "roadshow" - the promoter goes out canvassing for investors to buy up the placement shares. It earns a fee for this marketing effort. The second part is the underwriting. The promoter may or may not choose to underwrite the issue. If it does underwrite the issue, it earns a separate commission, usually a percentage of the money raised by the company. There's usually a fixed minimum for the fee charged, which is why some small companies end up paying a large percentage of the funds raised to the underwriter.
Quote:
My rudimentary understanding from the term "underwriting" is to bear the undesirable consequence on behalf of the insured for a fee.What does it mean in the case of underwriting for IPO?
An underwriter for an IPO guarantees the company (the insured) against a failure of the IPO (undersubscription for the shares being offered). If the underwriter cannot find enough buyers for all available shares, it has to buy any excess shares itself. Thus the company itself is protected against the possibility of a failed IPO. This risk has been transferred to the underwriter.
A good example of the underwriter being called upon would be Chartered Semiconductor's failed rights issue a couple of years back. Merrill Lynch chose to underwrite the issue, and when the rights issue failed, Merrill Lynch had to buy up all the unsubscribed rights and exercise them, becoming a shareholder of Chartered. Ultimately the share price of Chartered rose enough that Merrill Lynch managed to dispose of the shares and come out ahead, but it illustrates the risks involved with being too hungry for business.
Normally the promoter will underwrite an IPO only if it's confident it can sell all the shares, or if it's desperate for business. Naturally, an underwritten IPO commands higher fees than a non-underwritten one, otherwise nobody would take on the additional risk. If the issue is large, there may be more than one underwriter, and the risks and fees are shared accordingly.
-------------------------------------------
d.o.g.
Junior Member
Posts: 78 Registered: 3-1-2005 Member Is Offline
posted on 10-5-2005 at 08:58 PM
Quote:
The marketing of the issue is being carry out together by a public relation company and a investment/capital company. In westcomb case is actually taken by "Westcomb Capital" and "Quattro Media". Where both earn commission base on a pre agreement amount. It is so?
I was writing in general terms and was not referring specifically to Westcomb. However it would not be surprising that the marketing is being done by 2 separate companies under a common owner. This allows the IR/PR and promoting/underwriting companies to operate independently of each other and potentially capture additional business on their own.
Quote:
So most of revenues earn from IPO by "Westcomb Capital " actually come from:Pre- IPO --- Teaching and leading a company to become a listed company.Post - IPO --- What kind of services is needed here???
For the IR/PR company:
Pre-IPO Services:
1. marketing via roadshows, TV/press coverage
2. development of corporate IR website
Post-IPO services:
1. press releases
2. answering simple questions from the public
3. maintenance of corporate IR website
For the promoting/underwriting company:Pre-IPO services:
1. assistance with share registration
2. restructuring of shareholdings
3. creation of nominee accounts
4. ensure compliance with listing rules
5. marketing via roadshows, TV/press coverage
Post-IPO services:nil
================
That's more or less it, in a nutshell. It should be clear that the investment banking arm generates the bulk of the revenue, but it's all one-off. Only the IR/PR business has consistent revenue, but it's peanuts. That's why Westcomb has a capital markets licence - so that it can operate its own pre-IPO fund to generate additional profits, or so it hopes.
Westcomb also has a stockbroking licence, to provide additional share-related services like nominee services, (maybe) margin lending etc. This will allow it to squeeze a few more dollars from its existing clients. It's always cheaper to extract more cash from your current clients then to acquire a new client. Westcomb's growing array of services is probably following this line of thought.
It's true that IPOs (which are one-off in nature) apparently constitute only 1/3 of revenue, but keep in mind that the so-called ECM and stockbroking activity that makes up half of revenue is also one-off. How many times can any one company raise debt or sell equity? How much can you earn on stockbroking fees when you don't cater to the mass market or private banking clients? Think about it. This company's true recurring revenue is only the PR and fund management activity - just 7% of revenue.As usual, the standard disclaimers apply.
-----
d.o.g.
Junior Member
Posts: 78 Registered: 3-1-2005 Member Is Offline
posted on 11-5-2005 at 10:44 AM
Quote:
The main question is as to whether the 12.3M revenue from"Securities trading and ECM syndication" is composed mainly of IPO related activity.Sage and d.o.g do not seem to think so.
To be more accurate, I'm not really concerned as to whether securities trading and ECM syndication consists mostly of IPO-related activity. What I am concerned about is that whether IPO, listed company or private equity, ALL investment banking activities are non-recurrent in nature. In other words, Westcomb's business is highly volatile. There is no such thing as a regular customer - every customer is new.
Quote:
this company HAS consistently increased revenue and profits over the past four years by generating new clients not from increasing recurrent income - so maybe they are good at it?
They may have been good the past 4 years, but unfortunately the past is no guide to the future. The recent past is a reasonable glimpse of the future only when business conditions are assumed to be stable. But without regular customers and most of its business from China (hardly a stable environment), is there any predictability?
The second weakness of Westcomb is poor scalability. There is a human limit to the number of deals each team can do. Beyond that you just need more bodies.
And Westcomb can't go for bigger deals per team - Choo Chee Kong himself admitted that they are limited to deals of a certain size (either $30m or $100m IIRC). Beyond this the companies will go straight to the big boys.So while the numbers look good (as with almost all professional services companies) Westcomb is held back by 2 fundamental weaknesses in its core investment banking business:
1. Revenue is one-off in nature; and
2. Poor scalability.
And of course to top it off China's new SAFE-related regulations have dammed the flow of deals, so the future is murky to say the least.
There's a good reason why most investment banks also house proprietary trading desks or live under the wing of a commercial bank - investment banking earnings are just too volatile for the business to survive independently.
----------------------
d.o.g.
Junior Member
Posts: 78 Registered: 3-1-2005 Member Is Offline
posted on 12-5-2005 at 11:23 AM
Quote:
unlock
westcomb become something like Morgan stanley or Price Water house Coopers
g18
It takes a very long time to build up a franchise and brand name like Morgan Stanley.
Morgan Stanley's current troubles also illustrate that:
1. Reputation is THE key asset, but it can be destroyed easily by a few bad moves; and
2. I-banking is tremendously dependent on key staff (rainmakers). If they leave, the business follows them.
Westcomb is similarly dependent on its team leaders and Choo Chee Kong's reputation and contacts from his time at DBS. If any staff conflicts arise, the teams will be weakened and clients will be scared off. There are many small i-banks even in Singapore - just look at who's been bringing IPOs to market lately.
And apart from the boutique i-banks you still have the larger full service i-banks backed by banks and financial institutions. So IMHO Westcomb is walking a tightrope. So far, so good - but it's always going to be a tightrope - with no safety net below.
Friday, September 24, 2004
Zhongguo Powerplus
THE ILLOGIC OF THE MARKET
Because stock and bond prices reflect the present value of future expectations, for every fact available to the market, there are ten rumors and illogical interpretations, just as there are vastly more 'paper barrels' of oil trading in the oil futures market than there is real oil available.
-- Craig Gordon
There are times when watching the stock market react to various bits of news and rumors is enough to make you require restraining in a straight jacket before you go completely mad. I experienced one such occasion recently with the IPO of a Chinese maker of handheld power equipment like weed-eaters, leaf-blowers and fertilizer sprayers called Zhongguo Powerplus.
Let me recount my experience.
The very day before the IPO launch of Zhongguo Powerplus, its Chairman, Mr. S. Y. Lim slipped up during a press interview and said that he 'promised the company would achieve strong growth over the next few years', or something to that effect. Now, the problem with this statement was that it was not included in the IPO Prospectus, nor could it be factually proven with documented evidence... which means it contravenes a MAS rule about forecasting profits (some would argue this rule does more to silence management than to help investors stay well informed, but that is another issue).
How did the market react to this situation? You might think, 'Aha, the cat is out of the bag, Powerplus is definitely on the growth path ahead of what is disclosed in the lawyer-jargoned prospectus, so shrewd investors will be buying en force'. Well, just the opposite occurred, and market participants seemed to focus on the 'controversy' of Mr. Lim's inadvertent disclosure and possible rule breaking, and the stock price opened weak and closed the first day just below its 23 cent IPO price.
But Mr. Lim appeared determined to show that he may have spoke too soon, but what he spoke was indeed the truth, and Powerplus announced its first-half June 2004 financial results just weeks after its IPO launch. How were the results? Well, sales rose 108% and net profits soared 274%. Mr. Lim was vindicated! Or was he? Instead of focusing on these sterling factual business progress results, the market again chose to focus on something less tangible, insider selling. A non-executive director from China had sold about half his stake following the IPO. Market participants decided they had better sell too (without any further information about why this non-executive director sold).
Even today, Zhongguo Powerplus continues to fall to new lows almost every day. It is now trading around 21 cents (from 23 cent IPO price, prior to the announcement of half-year results). At 21 cents, the stock is trading at only about 5-times current year earnings (assuming second half earnings match first half, which management expects to be the case). Sales double, profits quadruple, prospects look bright, and the stock price tanks. One has to wonder about the logic of the market in cases like this. What are traders thinking? Are traders thinking? Every seller at 21 cents today, given that it is a record low price, is presumably selling for a loss. Why sell at a loss at such an attractive valuation for such a promising easy-to-understand business? Oh, the painful lack of logic of it all... where is my straight jacket?!
Sage@wallstraits.com
Disclosure: Wallstraits owns shares of Zhongguo Powerplus. We found the illogic of most market particupants in this case too hard to resist, and have accumulated our holding at below IPO price for this promising little China business. You can follow all our contrarian value-oriented moves with our real-dollar WS8 Portfolio by clicking here now (and get a free Sage book).
Because stock and bond prices reflect the present value of future expectations, for every fact available to the market, there are ten rumors and illogical interpretations, just as there are vastly more 'paper barrels' of oil trading in the oil futures market than there is real oil available.
-- Craig Gordon
There are times when watching the stock market react to various bits of news and rumors is enough to make you require restraining in a straight jacket before you go completely mad. I experienced one such occasion recently with the IPO of a Chinese maker of handheld power equipment like weed-eaters, leaf-blowers and fertilizer sprayers called Zhongguo Powerplus.
Let me recount my experience.
The very day before the IPO launch of Zhongguo Powerplus, its Chairman, Mr. S. Y. Lim slipped up during a press interview and said that he 'promised the company would achieve strong growth over the next few years', or something to that effect. Now, the problem with this statement was that it was not included in the IPO Prospectus, nor could it be factually proven with documented evidence... which means it contravenes a MAS rule about forecasting profits (some would argue this rule does more to silence management than to help investors stay well informed, but that is another issue).
How did the market react to this situation? You might think, 'Aha, the cat is out of the bag, Powerplus is definitely on the growth path ahead of what is disclosed in the lawyer-jargoned prospectus, so shrewd investors will be buying en force'. Well, just the opposite occurred, and market participants seemed to focus on the 'controversy' of Mr. Lim's inadvertent disclosure and possible rule breaking, and the stock price opened weak and closed the first day just below its 23 cent IPO price.
But Mr. Lim appeared determined to show that he may have spoke too soon, but what he spoke was indeed the truth, and Powerplus announced its first-half June 2004 financial results just weeks after its IPO launch. How were the results? Well, sales rose 108% and net profits soared 274%. Mr. Lim was vindicated! Or was he? Instead of focusing on these sterling factual business progress results, the market again chose to focus on something less tangible, insider selling. A non-executive director from China had sold about half his stake following the IPO. Market participants decided they had better sell too (without any further information about why this non-executive director sold).
Even today, Zhongguo Powerplus continues to fall to new lows almost every day. It is now trading around 21 cents (from 23 cent IPO price, prior to the announcement of half-year results). At 21 cents, the stock is trading at only about 5-times current year earnings (assuming second half earnings match first half, which management expects to be the case). Sales double, profits quadruple, prospects look bright, and the stock price tanks. One has to wonder about the logic of the market in cases like this. What are traders thinking? Are traders thinking? Every seller at 21 cents today, given that it is a record low price, is presumably selling for a loss. Why sell at a loss at such an attractive valuation for such a promising easy-to-understand business? Oh, the painful lack of logic of it all... where is my straight jacket?!
Sage@wallstraits.com
Disclosure: Wallstraits owns shares of Zhongguo Powerplus. We found the illogic of most market particupants in this case too hard to resist, and have accumulated our holding at below IPO price for this promising little China business. You can follow all our contrarian value-oriented moves with our real-dollar WS8 Portfolio by clicking here now (and get a free Sage book).
Thursday, September 02, 2004
Saturday, August 14, 2004
AGVA
Annonced 1HFY04 results, very disappointing to due increasing raw material costs because of high oil price.
To hold until annoncement of 2HFY04 results to assess the revenue growth.
- Expected revenue to growth from:
1. USA - new market which was described as huger potential
2. Japan - continue trend
3. Europe - moderate growth
4. China - due to acquisition of China sub. in 1 June 04 with huge distribution network
- Management ability to contain cost and improve margin of 1HFY04
- Operating cashflow should continue to be positive, although the company paid S$3.28M for a buidling in Aug04
- Continue dividend declaration amid lower amount
Initial investment merits - Thoughts
- make use of low manufacturing costs in China to produce for OEM worldwide
Tuesday, August 10, 2004
Fibrechem
Investment merits:
1. Strong cashflow
2. potential for increase in dividend yield
3. niche player
4. strong growth, average of at least 15% over next 2 years
5. garment market in China growing rapidly
Risks
1. Raw material priced - fluctuate with oil prices
- may be able to pass on higher cost to customer
2. Foreign competition?
Purchases made - see Trading Scapebook
1. Strong cashflow
2. potential for increase in dividend yield
3. niche player
4. strong growth, average of at least 15% over next 2 years
5. garment market in China growing rapidly
Risks
1. Raw material priced - fluctuate with oil prices
- may be able to pass on higher cost to customer
2. Foreign competition?
Purchases made - see Trading Scapebook
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